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Those who care about the future of democracy in Russia view with anxiety recent 
reports from Moscow concerning: the growing arrogance of organized crime; the 
activation of the Russian nazis; and the activities of the authorities and of all those 
institutions that are supposed to protect Russian citizens, their rights and freedoms, and 
the fragile growths of Russian democracy.
Obviously, public attention in Russia will focus on these issues during the next 
parliamentary and presidential elections, scheduled for 1995 and 1996, respectively. 
However, at this point it is unclear whether the elections will take place as scheduled in 
accordance with the Constitution. So far, most politicians, both in the presidential camp 
and in opposition, claim publicly that voting will take place on time, while privately 
agreeing that Yel'tsin's inner circle will try to postpone the elections.
The country was still reeling after the assassination of the well-known TV anchorman 
and executive, Vladislav Listyev, when it heard the news of the murder of the well-
known businessman, Oleg Zverev. The elimination of prominent Russian figures, 
particularly of members of so-called "business circles," has long been part of everyday 
life, and according to the politician Grigori Yavlinsky, the death of Listyev was the 19th 
"contract hit" by hired assassins since the beginning of this year. Yet this is only part of 
the picture. According to data published by Ogonek in March of 1995, law enforcement 
agencies reported that 2,632,700 crimes were committed in Russia during 1994, with 
7,800 cases of murder remaining unsolved.(1) In Moscow, 1,820 persons were killed in 
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1994 (an average of 5 murders a day), while only in 36.5 percent of the cases did 
investigation lead to the identification or arrest of the murderer.(2)
As a result, 71 percent of all Russian citizens, according to a poll conducted by the 
Russian Parliamentary Sociology Institute, are convinced that their state and their 
government are neither trying nor able to protect them; 59 percent claim that they 
constantly fear for their lives and the lives of their relatives; while 21 percent state that 
they feel unsafe even in their apartments or homes. More than one-third of those polled 
are convinced that the government is acting only in the interests of various criminal 
structures, including the mafia, while 43 percent believe already that all power in the 
country belongs to organized crime--the mafia.(3)
Various "nazi" and "fascist" elements are being activated across the country and, in 
most cases, these groups either act openly and without any fear of being prosecuted, or 
receive very mild and even almost favorable treatment from those who are supposed to 
prosecute them in accordance with existing laws and the Constitution. Following his first 
acquittal for publication of Hitler's Mein Kampf, the well-known St. Petersburg anti-
Semite, Viktor Bezverkhi, was acquitted again. This time, he was taken to court for the 
publication of his own book, The History of Religion, which contained appeals to carry 
out Hitler's "final solution" and eliminate all Jews. The time of the trial coincided with the 
convention in St. Petersburg of the openly fascist People's Social Party, which had 
raised money to provide legal protection for Bezverkhi during his trial.(4)
Aleksei Vedenkin, one of the self-proclaimed leaders of Russian National Unity, another 
fascist group in Moscow, was released from Lefortovo prison on March 24. A month 
earlier, in a February 22 interview on Ostankino television, Vedenkin had threatened to 
kill personally two democratically minded Duma deputies and human rights activists--
Sergei Kovalev and Sergei Yushenkov. A week later he was arrested at the initiative of 
the acting Russian prosecutor general, but the officials of the Moscow City Court saw no 
reason to keep him in detention.(5) Street kiosks and shops in Moscow are filled with 
such items as rings, chains, and t-shirts emblazoned with swastikas and inscriptions like 
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"European tour 1939-1945."(6) Under the circumstances, Yel'tsin's decree of March 
1995, aimed at combating fascist and extremist groups in Russia, seemed to be timely, 
if not belated.(7) Yet this decree has not generated any significant response from the 
major political parties, and has remained almost unnoticed by Russia's democratic 
media.
One of the reasons for this silence is the fact that many presidential decrees exist only 
on paper, and are never enacted. Partially as a result (as the poll mentioned earlier 
demonstrated), most Russians do not believe that their government and law 
enforcement agencies will do anything meaningful to improve the current situation and 
to protect them from domestic threats. On the other hand, many fear any attempt to 
strengthen the repressive character of their government: Memories of the police state, 
and especially the notorious KGB, are still fresh in the minds of millions of Russians.
Boris Yel'tsin on April 3 signed the bill "On the Federal Security Service" that was 
adopted by the State Duma; however, most of its provisions had been disseminated 
previously by the Russian and Western media. This new law gives the FSK--the so-
called legal successor of the KGB, which in the process of reorganization is supposed 
to change its name to Federal Security Service (FSS)--a great deal of power even when 
compared with "the old days of the Soviet Union." This law allows the security service to 
break into the homes and offices of Russian citizens, to open private mail and to place 
spies inside state agencies and private companies. In fact, the law allows the security 
service to cover the entire country with a network of informants who will be paid for 
information provided.(8) What is new, even compared with the Soviet past, is the token 
role given to the prosecutor's office. For example, under the law, the security service 
can spy on persons, businesses and other government agencies on mere suspicion of 
subversion or criminal activity. No proof of such suspicion is required, and the service 
only has to notify the prosecutor's office of a forcible entry into someone's property 24 
hours after the event, while the prosecutor is powerless to challenge this notification.(9) 
Even during the Soviet period, the KGB was supposed to notify the prosecutor's office 
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about similar steps in advance, although this "formality," of course, was hardly ever 
observed.
The security service not only is regaining all the power needed to conduct 
investigations, run prisons and command special armed anti-riot units; the law allows it 
also to conduct intelligence operations abroad.(10)
As in the past, one of the main tasks of the security service is to combat organized 
crime. On the one hand, this does seem natural for an agency that includes well-armed 
and well-trained professionals; however, one should not disregard the population's 
traditional fears of the role of the security organs, and a number of existing realities. 
Aleksei Vedenkin, leader of the neofascist Russian National Unity, was not merely 
boasting when he claimed that "90 percent of all the employees of the highest and 
second echelons of the special services belong to our people."(11) In addition, the 
creation of this old/new security service might again concentrate too much power in the 
hands not only of certain agencies, but also of specific individuals. As reported by 
Aleksandr Platkovsky in Izvestiya, the law might lead toward the creation of "some sort 
of super-organ upon which the president could rely. The need for this organ will continue 
to grow, especially in light of the coming elections, or cancellation of the elections. It is 
also believed that the FSS would unite under its roof the FSK and the Chief 
Government Protection Department headed by Mikhail Barsukov. In this case, there is 
no doubt that this new special service would be headed...by General Barsukov."(12)
The role of Mikhail Barsukov, a close ally and personal friend of Yel'tsin's chief 
bodyguard Aleksandr Korzhakov, is viewed by Russian democrats as sinister in part 
because of his support of Russia's aggressive war in Chechnya. Among those who 
accused Barsukov's department of wiretapping the telephones and offices of the 
government and presidential staff were Vladimir Kvasov, former head of the government 
apparatus, and Sergei Filatov, Yel'tsin's chief of staff, who said that "everyone [in the 
Presidential administration] believes that the phones and offices are tapped. I also think 
so."(13) In another interview, with the popular Russian weekly Argumenty i Fakty, 
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Filatov said that, as chief of staff, he had no control over Barsukov's department and 
that even in his office "most of the employees use pen and paper to write notes to each 
other...if it is true, if they are collecting files against us...it is really terrible even to think 
about the possible implications...that's what causes my intuitive worries and 
concerns."(14)
In addition, the Russian president's reaction to Listyev's assassination also caused 
concern. In his speech to the employees of Ostankino, Yel'tsin called for law 
enforcement officials to follow the example of their colleagues in Uzbekistan, where 
members of certain gangs had been shot without any trial (as most of the Russian 
papers reported later, President Yel'tsin made a mistake--the gangs were executed in 
Turkmenistan, under the orders of the "father of all Turkmenians" President Saparmyrat 
Niyzarov). Still, his words were immediately supported by some prominent 
representatives of the Russian public, such as film actress Liudmila Gurchenko, who, in 
a TV interview broadcast the same day, stated that "if people get killed under 
democracy, we do not need democracy in this country at all."(15) A story in Izvestiya 
concerning Yel'tsin's promise of a crackdown appeared under the headline: "We have all 
the reasons to be afraid of the creation of a police state."(16) Vitaly Tretyakov, editor-in-
chief of Nezavisimaya gazeta, asked in an article: "Why should we do it as they do it in 
Uzbekistan, and why can't we try to do it as they do it, let's say, in France?"(17) These 
attitudes led Izvestiya to post another front-page headline: "Under a new name, the old 
KGB is being recreated."(18)
The strengthening of the special services, as well as growing fears that their new 
powers would only allow them further to violate human rights, and to return to the 
practice of persecuting political opponents, are causing deep concern among those who 
care about Russian democracy's fate. At the same time, the obvious split among the 
leading democratic parties and groups in Russia has rendered them impotent to 
consolidate their forces and to confront attempts to curb the fragile achievements of 
Russian democracy. The fact that today the three major democratic groups and parties--
Yegor Gaidar's "Russia's Democratic Choice," Grigori Yavlinsky's, Yuri Boldyrev's, and 
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Vladimir Lukin's "Yabloko," and Boris Fyodorov's "Forward Russia!"--refuse to 
coordinate their policies and to enter into an electoral alliance significantly weakens all 
Russian democratic forces, and, in case elections are held, may allow their opponents 
to come to power. As Izvestiya put it in another front-page headline: "The reformists 
must know: if the elections take place tomorrow, the winners would be communists and 
their allies."(19) It seems quite unrealistic to hope that some other reformist groups and 
parties, such as Sergei Shakrai's "Party of Russian Unity and Concord" or Aleksandr 
Yakovlev's "Social-Democratic Party" would be in a position to gain many votes.
Under the circumstances, not only a number of key Yel'tsin allies but also some of the 
representatives of Russian big business, such as Oleg Boyko, director of the Olbi 
investment company and president of the National Credit Bank, have begun to fear the 
potential results of elections and to explore the possibility of postponing both 
parliamentary and presidential ballots. Boyko's initiative has also won the support of 
another powerful banker--Aleksandr Smolensky, president of the Stolichny bank.(20)
It is expected that most of the Russian democratic parties and movements, together 
with the opposition, will try to persuade the president and his administration not to 
postpone the elections, even though some of them understand that their forces are 
much too divided to win. However, such presidential policies as the ongoing war in 
Chechnya, his alliance with the power ministries, and the fear that a new police state is 
being created, have eroded support for Yel'tsin among democratic and pro-reform 
forces. Without this support, the president will find it difficult to implement some of his 
plans and ideas. He will be in a position to renew the dialogue with the Russian 
democrats only if he takes the first step in their direction and if he convinces them that 
all their fears concerning the creation of a police state are groundless as long as Yel'tsin 
remains in charge.
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